

THE YALTA CONFERENCE



STUDY GUIDE



YALTA CONFERENCE

Agenda

Deliberating upon the nature of the post Second World War global order, including the political reorganization of Europe, resolution of the Pacific War, and establishment of an effective International Organisation.

Freeze Date - 4th February 1945

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LETTER FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

Dear Delegates,

Welcome to Argonaut, as you step on board, expect some turbulence.

This agenda is one that's very personal to us. It's comprehensive in a way that few agendas are, to the point where honestly, every single part of it, Germany, Poland, the wider question of Eastern Europe, the Pacific, the UN, could easily have stood on its own as an entire agenda. Since we can't give you four committees in one, our approach will be to work through it in parts, deliberate properly on one piece, find real solutions for it, and then move forward to the next, so that by the end we've covered as much ground as we possibly can without losing depth along the way.

At its core, this is a committee about deliberation, but more than anything, we want it to be a space where you learn and grow as delegates. If at any point you feel lost, confused, or unsure of where things are headed, please don't hesitate to approach the Executive Board, we are here for exactly that, and there is no such thing as a silly question in this room. However, your journey with this committee doesn't start when the gavel comes down, it starts now, with the reading and the research you put in.

While we do expect serious, thoughtful debate given the weight of the agenda, we also want every one of you to enjoy the process. Most importantly, be ready to adapt as the committee evolves. Stay curious, and don't be afraid to make mistakes along the way, that's part of how you get better. Speak up, keep those placards raised, and stay in the room even when you're unsure of yourself, half of diplomacy is simply showing up and being heard. Push yourself to participate actively, adjust as the situation on the ground shifts, and carry yourself like a diplomat even when it feels uncomfortable, that discomfort is usually where the real learning happens.

With regards,

The Executive Board

Yalta Conference, 1945

INTRODUCTION

The Yalta Conference, held at the Livadia Palace on the Crimean coast from 4 to 11 February 1945 under the codename *Argonaut*, remains one of the most consequential and heavily debated diplomatic events of the twentieth century. Representing the second wartime summit among the "Big Three" Allied powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Britain, this committee expands that dynamic by officially seating the French Republic, represented by the envoy of *General Charles de Gaulle*, as a principal negotiator.



By the time delegates convene, the outcome of the war in Europe is no longer seriously in doubt, but its timeline, and the political shape of what follows it, remain entirely unsettled. Germany has not yet surrendered, and the peace that will eventually replace it has not yet been written. What brings the Allies to the same table is not the end of the fighting but the recognition that the fighting is ending faster than any agreement on what comes after it. The military and political circumstances that shape each delegation's leverage at this exact moment are addressed in detail in the Contemporary Situation section that follows, and delegates are expected to treat that section, rather than this one, as the operative account of where matters stand on the ground.

This conference is not a single negotiation but several, conducted simultaneously and under pressure of time. The fate of a defeated Germany, the political future of Poland, the status of the wider Eastern Bloc, the terms of Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and the founding architecture of a new international organization are all live questions that must be resolved, or at least managed, within the same short window. None of these questions can be settled in isolation. Concessions made on one front will shape what is possible on another, and delegates should approach this committee with that interdependence in mind rather than treating each agenda item as self-contained.

The Allies did not arrive here by shared conviction. They arrived by necessity, bound together by a common enemy rather than a common vision of the world that would follow its defeat. That distinction matters more at Yalta than at any previous wartime summit, because the war that has held the alliance together is now visibly ending, and with it, much of the reason the Allies needed each other in the first place. What replaces that necessity, whether continued cooperation, renewed rivalry, or something in between, is not predetermined. It is the task of this committee to decide.

Significance of the Freeze Date

Delegates, please note that the committee is taking place on 4th February 1945. With regard to the freeze date, it is to be kept in mind that all events which have taken place after 4th February 1945, are NOT to be referred to during committee sessions. The Executive Board of this committee has complete jurisdiction over every activity or event that takes place after the said freeze date. This study guide entails certain core concepts and information beyond the freeze date as well which are purely for the overall understanding of the committee and agenda and not to be used as reference or citations.

As of this date, the Second World War has not ended, though the negotiations that will shape the postwar order are only just beginning. Understanding the freeze date is essential to understanding everything that follows in this guide, since every compromise reached at Yalta was shaped by what its negotiators did and did not yet know. Delegates entering this committee should hold themselves to the same limit.



KEY POWER BLOCS

AXIS POWERS

The Axis powers were initially united by a treaty called *the Anti-Comintern Pact* of 1936. The term “Comintern” referred to the Communist International, a global organization of communist parties working to foment worldwide revolution led by the Soviet Union. The initial signers of the Anti-Comintern Pact were Germany and Japan.



The Anti-Comintern Pact was motivated by Germany and Japan’s shared view of the international order in the late 1930s. Adolf Hitler had taken power in Germany in 1933, first as chancellor and then with the newly created title of Führer. Over the next few years, Hitler consolidated power, rearmed the country in violation of the Treaty of Versailles, and took an aggressive stance toward his European neighbors.

In Asia, Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s government was increasingly dominated by militant nationalists. In 1931, Japan invaded the Chinese region of Manchuria and established a puppet state called *Manchukuo*. Japan’s expansion in the east would inevitably target European colonial possessions in the region. In addition, both Germany and Japan were avowedly anticommunist, both had banned the Communist Party domestically, and both might be physically threatened by the Soviet Union.

Negotiations for a formal treaty began in summer of 1936, and the Anti-Comintern Pact was officially signed on November 25, 1936. Italy’s Fascist government under Benito Mussolini joined the treaty in 1937. This new alliance was nicknamed the Rome–Berlin–Tokyo Axis, or the Axis for short. In September 1940 a year after the start of World War II Germany, Italy, and Japan *signed the Tripartite Act* pledging mutual military and economic support for one another. Additional countries signed the Tripartite Pact before and during the war, including Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria, contributing to the Axis military effort for much of the war.

Despite this complicated history, the countries most commonly referred to as the “Axis powers” are the original signatories of the Tripartite Pact: Germany, Japan, and Italy. However, the term can be more loosely applied to any country that signed the Tripartite Pact during the war.

ALLIED POWERS

Allied powers, coalition of countries that opposed the Axis powers (led by Germany, Italy, and Japan) during World War II. The principal members of the Allies were the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China (the “Big Four”), as well as France while it was unoccupied. The Allies also included every other signatory to the Declaration by United Nations (January 1, 1942): Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, and Yugoslavia. Later wartime signers were Mexico, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Iraq, Brazil, Bolivia, Iran, Colombia, Liberia, France, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela, Uruguay, Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon.

The Allies began as an agreement between Poland, the United Kingdom, and France that the latter two would come to Poland’s aid if it were invaded by Germany. When Germany did attack on September 1, 1939, the United Kingdom and France fulfilled their promise, declaring war against Germany on September 3. The independent British dominions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa followed the United Kingdom’s lead, declaring war either that same day or a few days later.

Denmark and Norway joined the Allies the next year when Germany invaded both countries on April 9, 1940. So too did the Low Countries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) that May, once Germany repeated its World War I strategy of moving its forces through those countries to invade France. All these new partnerships were short-lived, however, as Germany swiftly conquered each country. The same sequence of events would play out again in southeastern Europe: Greece and Yugoslavia joined the Allies on October 28, 1940, and April 6, 1941, respectively, but were soon occupied. With France surrendering on June 22,

1940, the United Kingdom and its former colonies were effectively the only Allies in action for over a year, from mid-1940 to mid-1941.

CONSISTED OF THE FOLLOWING -

I. The United States of America

The United States, represented by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, supports a broadly universalist approach to the post-war international order, drawing on the principles of the Atlantic Charter to promote an open international economy, national self-determination, and a system of collective security in which the four major powers would assume responsibility for maintaining international stability. Although the United States does not formally support the division of Europe into exclusive spheres of influence, Roosevelt seeks to bring the Soviet Union into a wider international framework and places considerable emphasis on personal diplomacy in managing relations with Stalin.

At the same time, American policy is limited by Roosevelt's reluctance to accept a prolonged military and political commitment in Europe, as he privately expects American forces to withdraw from the continent within two years of the war's conclusion, which reduces the extent to which the United States can exercise long-term influence over questions such as the occupation and future political structure of Germany. In the immediate term, a central American objective is to secure Soviet participation in the war against Japan, particularly in Manchuria, where Soviet forces could engage the Japanese Kwantung Army and reduce the strength of Japanese resistance before the planned American invasion of the Japanese home islands, thereby limiting the anticipated American military losses.

II. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The Soviet Union, led by Premier Joseph Stalin, approaches the post-war settlement through a combination of ideological interests and security concerns, with the experience of repeated German invasions making the prevention of another attack the central concern of Soviet policy. The war had resulted in approximately 27 million Soviet deaths and extensive destruction across large parts of the country, strengthening Stalin's demand for a weakened Germany, potentially

including the division of the German state, alongside substantial reparations, with the Soviet Union seeking a total of \$20 billion in reparations, half of which would be allocated to the USSR.

The Soviet Union also seeks to establish a belt of governments that are politically friendly and dependent on Moscow along its western frontier, with Poland being of particular importance because of its geographic position and its history as a route for invasions of Russian and Soviet territory. By February 1945, the Red Army's presence in Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and parts of Czechoslovakia had given Stalin significant leverage in negotiations over the political future of Eastern Europe, while his willingness to negotiate over areas of influence, as shown by the October 1944 percentages agreement with Churchill, indicates a pragmatic approach to diplomacy; however, the Soviet leadership remains firmly committed to maintaining decisive influence over the states of Eastern Europe.

III. The United Kingdom

Great Britain, led by Prime Minister Winston Churchill, relies on its traditional strategy: maintaining a balance of power on the European continent and preserving the British Empire. Churchill wants to ensure that no single power, especially the Soviet Union dominates Europe. Britain seeks to protect its route to India and its influence in the eastern Mediterranean, particularly in Greece, where British forces recently fought a civil conflict to secure a non-communist government.

Churchill views Poland's independence as a matter of national honor, as Britain declared war in 1939 to defend it. However, facing the reality of Soviet military occupation, Churchill is willing to make harsh realpolitik compromises, including recognizing the Curzon Line as Poland's eastern border. To offset British military exhaustion, Churchill strongly advocated for France to receive an occupation zone in Germany and a seat on the Control Council, ensuring an additional Western ally to balance Soviet power.

PREVIOUS ALLIED CONFERENCES

The Yalta Conference did not emerge on its own; it was the product of a series of earlier summits that had already established both the framework of Allied cooperation and the disputes that would carry through into 1945.

At **Placentia Bay** in August 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met aboard the USS Augusta off the coast of Newfoundland and drafted the Atlantic Charter, a declaration that was not legally binding but set out eight shared principles for the postwar world, including the rejection of territorial expansion, the liberalization of international trade, freedom of the seas, and the restoration of self-government to occupied nations. Neither leader left the meeting having achieved all of his immediate political aims. Churchill was unable to draw the United States directly into the war or secure a firm American warning to Japan, while he also had concerns about the Charter's language on self-determination, which he feared could encourage demands for independence within the British Empire. Its trade provisions also had the potential to weaken support within his own party for imperial tariff policies. Roosevelt, meanwhile, was unable to move American public opinion away from isolationism, a shift that would only take place after the attack on Pearl Harbor, although he used the meeting to place pressure on Britain to abandon secret wartime territorial agreements and to use Lend-Lease as leverage in discussions over trade and tariffs.

Despite these limitations, Churchill returned to Britain with the document and secured its approval by the Cabinet, recognising the value of the Charter in strengthening the relationship between Britain and the United States. The document subsequently acquired a significance that extended beyond the immediate aims of either leader, as it publicly affirmed Anglo-American cooperation, established a set of principles based on self-determination and international cooperation that influenced Roosevelt's later approach to collective security, and, although not necessarily intended by either government, provided political language that would later be used by anti-colonial movements in places including Algeria and Vietnam.

The **Casablanca Conference** followed in January 1943, bringing Roosevelt and Churchill together in Morocco from the 14th to the 24th, with Stalin invited but unable to attend on account of the Red Army's ongoing offensive on the Eastern Front. The two leaders used the meeting mainly to settle Allied military strategy for the year ahead, agreeing to concentrate their resources against Germany in order to draw German strength away from the Soviet front and to step up the flow of supplies to Moscow. It was on the final day that Roosevelt announced their joint decision to demand unconditional surrender from the Axis powers, a policy he was careful to clarify did not mean the destruction of entire populations but rather, in his words, the destruction of the philosophies built on conquest and the subjugation of other peoples. The decision grew directly out of the aims already set down at Placentia Bay and reflected Roosevelt's determination to avoid a repeat of the situation after the First World War, when large parts of German society came to believe their army had never actually been defeated but had instead been betrayed from within, and it also served to reassure Moscow that neither Washington nor London intended to negotiate a separate peace with Germany.

By the time of the **Tehran Conference** in late November and early December of 1943, all three Allied leaders sat at the same table for the first time, meeting in Iran to coordinate strategy against both Germany and Japan and to work through several questions that would shape the postwar order. The central military outcome was British and American agreement to launch Operation Overlord by May of 1944, an invasion of northern France that the Soviets had been demanding for years as a second front, and in exchange the Red Army committed to a fresh offensive in the east timed to draw German forces away from the coming landings, while Stalin also gave his word, in principle, that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated, a commitment for which Roosevelt agreed to concede the Kurile Islands, the southern half of Sakhalin, and access to the ice free ports of Dairen and Port Arthur on the Liaodong Peninsula, though the precise terms of this arrangement were left unresolved until Yalta itself. The conference also touched on the shape of postwar Eastern Europe, with Stalin pressing for Poland's eastern border to be redrawn along the line proposed by Lord Curzon back in 1920, and the three leaders settling, at least in principle, on shifting Poland's western border to the Oder and Neisse rivers as compensation, a decision that would not be formally confirmed until Potsdam.

The **Dumbarton Oaks Conference**, held at the Georgetown estate of that name between August and October of 1944, marked the point at which planning for a new international organization began to take real shape. The four major Allied powers, the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China, worked out a basic structure for what would succeed the League of Nations, and this structure survived largely intact through to the San Francisco Conference a year later, though the talks at Dumbarton Oaks, initiated by Washington in fulfillment of the Moscow Declaration's call for a postwar body, left several matters unresolved, most notably the voting procedure of the proposed Security Council and the question of separate membership for the constituent Soviet republics. Both of these gaps would be closed at Yalta, where the leaders also worked out a trusteeship system intended to replace the League's old mandate arrangements, and the resulting proposals formed the basis on which the Charter of the United Nations was eventually negotiated at San Francisco.

That same October, at the Fourth **Moscow Conference**, codenamed Tolstoy, Stalin and Churchill met primarily to settle a timetable for Soviet entry into the war against Japan, though Stalin treated the postwar balance of power in the Balkans as the more urgent matter. It was here that the two leaders reached their informal percentages agreement, dividing influence across Eastern and Southeastern Europe on a rough numerical basis, with the Soviets granted ninety percent predominance in Romania and seventy five in Bulgaria, the British given ten percent in Greece, and Yugoslavia and Hungary split evenly between the two. Alongside this, Stalin and Churchill discussed the deepening political rift over Poland's future government, attempting without much success to bridge the gap between the Soviet backed committees on the ground and the Polish government in exile still based in London, reviewed the timetable and conditions under which Soviet forces would eventually join the campaign against Japan, and settled joint policy and armistice terms for Bulgaria and Yugoslavia as the advancing Red Army continued to shift the balance of power across the region.

THE ANATOMY OF A DIVISION

Ideology of the United Kingdom -

The United Kingdom has traditionally sought to ensure no single power has a monopoly over Europe, to maintain a balance of power and act as a power broker. This principle also severely influenced Britain's ideology in the Yalta Conference, due to which Britain feared Soviet domination, as the Red Army, occupying Eastern Europe, continued marching towards Central Europe.

Churchill felt threatened that the defeat of Nazi would create a power vacuum, which shall be exploited by the Soviet Union. The Red Army had liberated and occupied several regions where post-war governments would be formed, such as Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and much of the Balkans. Due to the growing Soviet influence, Britain feared that France, Italy and Germany might eventually become vulnerable, economically and politically, to the Soviet pressure.

To minimise the growing threat and due to economical and structural dependence, the United Kingdom sought to strengthen ties with the United States. By the end of the war, British reserves were severely depleted. The United Kingdom lacked resources to counter Soviet influence without American aid. Therefore British reliance on the United States evolved to more than just diplomatic, by Yalta it had become economic, military, and strategic.

Economic dependence:

The British had spent much of its foreign currency and gold reserves on purchasing fuel, goods and raw materials for the war, and by the end of it they had collected substantial debt. Thus, the United States Lend Lease Programme was paramount to sustaining Britain's war efforts.

Military dependence:

By 1945, Britain's military was exhausted, both due to the prolonged war and extensive debt. While the United States emerged as a dominant industrial, military and financial power, Britain was suffering heavy losses. Due to this, the British

relied on American troops to counter Soviet influence, help maintain post-war order in Germany and maintain naval and air forces in the Mediterranean and Atlantic.

Therefore, Britain relied on the United States to maintain the Balance of Power in Europe. If the United States were to lessen their presence in Europe, Britain would be the main opposing, Western influence to counter the Soviet. Which it could not successfully accomplish due to its war-ridden economy, and Germany and France might become politically unstable or vulnerable to communist influence. Churchill therefore wanted the United States to remain a permanent European power, not merely an ally that intervened during wartime and then returned home.

The United Kingdom also viewed global political discussions as a forum to ensure British colonial empowerment. Churchill wanted to preserve the British colonies, which is why Britain sought to preserve British colonies by:

1. Preserving access to the Mediterranean and Suez Canal
2. Maintain influence in Greece, highlighted by Percentages Agreement
3. Prevent Soviet expansion towards Turkey
4. Protect sea routes to maintain naval superiority

Due to the principle of Balance of Power, Churchill supported representative, democratically chosen governments in post-war Europe, especially in previously Nazi-occupied territories like Poland. This was mainly to ensure the governments shall not be influenced by Moscow and to ensure Britain's Polish Ally would not fall to Soviet domination. However, this diplomatic stance contained severe contradiction, as Churchill, wanting to maintain cordial relations with Stalin, was willing to recognize Soviet influence in parts of Eastern Europe in order to preserve cooperation.

Altogether, British policy at Yalta was to restore Balance of Power, counter the growing Soviet influence, and maintain strategic, long lasting ties with the United States for self-interest.

Ideology of the United States-

The United States entered Argonaut with a fundamentally different vision of the post-war international order from Britain and the Soviet Union. Roosevelt did not believe that European stability should depend on a traditional Balance of Power, where major states maintained influence over particular regions. Instead, he envisioned a system of collective security in which the major powers would cooperate through a new international organisation. The United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union and China were expected to play a central role in maintaining this system.

This approach was strongly influenced by the perceived failures of the League of Nations. The United States believed that the absence of American participation, the lack of effective enforcement and the inability to respond quickly to international crises had weakened the organisation. Roosevelt therefore wanted the new international system to have the participation of the major powers from the beginning, particularly the Soviet Union.

Soviet cooperation was especially important because of the position of the Red Army in Eastern Europe. By February 1945, Soviet forces were already occupying or approaching Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and parts of Czechoslovakia. The United States could not simply ignore this reality. Roosevelt therefore believed that keeping Stalin within a cooperative Allied system was more practical than attempting to confront Soviet influence directly.

This created a major contradiction in American policy. The United States supported the principle of self-determination and wanted the peoples of liberated Europe to establish governments of their own choice. This was reflected in the proposed Declaration on Liberated Europe, which supported representative governments, restoration of sovereignty and free elections. Poland became the central test of this principle because the Soviet-backed Lublin government existed alongside the Polish government-in-exile recognised by Britain and the United States.

At the same time, Roosevelt was unwilling to allow the Polish question to destroy cooperation with Stalin. The United States therefore pushed for the Soviet-backed

Polish government to be reorganised to include additional democratic and non-communist representatives, alongside a commitment to free elections. Roosevelt's approach depended heavily on the belief that continued diplomatic cooperation and international pressure could gradually encourage Stalin to accept a broader political settlement.

The United States also did not intend to replace Soviet influence in Europe with permanent American military occupation. Roosevelt was wary of long-term European entanglements and expected American forces to withdraw from Europe after the war. This meant that the United States had to rely more heavily on diplomacy and international institutions than on maintaining a permanent military balance against the Soviet Union.

The Pacific War further strengthened the importance of Soviet cooperation. Although Germany was approaching defeat, Japan remained a major military problem, and the United States anticipated a difficult campaign. Soviet entry into the war against Japan, already discussed at Tehran, was therefore an important American objective at ARGONAUT.

The United States also differed from Britain over the future of the British Empire. Roosevelt was suspicious of European imperialism and was more sympathetic towards decolonisation, while Churchill wanted to preserve Britain's imperial position. Therefore, even within the Western alliance, the United States and Britain did not share identical ideas about the post-war world.

Overall, American policy at ARGONAUT attempted to reconcile two objectives: establishing a universal system based on collective security and self-government while maintaining Soviet cooperation. Roosevelt's challenge was that the principles the United States wanted to establish depended upon cooperation from the very Soviet government whose growing influence in Eastern Europe made those principles difficult to enforce.

Ideology of the Soviet Union-

Soviet foreign policy at the time of Argonaut was shaped by communist ideology as well as concerns over national security. Soviet leaders regarded the major capitalist powers with distrust, a view influenced by Western intervention during the Russian Civil War and by the United States' delayed recognition of the Soviet government.

Security had become a central concern by 1945, following Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 and the extensive destruction caused by the war, as well as the repeated invasions of Russian territory through its western frontier. Stalin therefore sought to establish a belt of friendly governments along the Soviet Union's western borders, particularly in Eastern Europe, which could provide greater security against any future threat from the West.

The advance of the Red Army had also given the Soviet Union considerable military influence across Eastern Europe, with Soviet forces occupying or approaching Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and parts of Czechoslovakia. The Soviet government consequently supported governments in these countries that would maintain friendly relations with Moscow and would not pose a threat to Soviet security.


Poland held particular importance in this policy, as the Soviet Union had recognised the Lublin Committee as the Provisional Government while Britain and the United States continued to recognise the Polish government-in-exile in London. Stalin supported the establishment of a Polish government that would remain friendly towards the Soviet Union and opposed arrangements through which the Western Allies could exercise a direct role in determining Poland's political future.

The same concerns were reflected in the Soviet position on elections and governments in the territories occupied by Soviet forces. While the Soviet Union accepted the principle of representative government, it opposed arrangements that could allow the Western powers to intervene directly in Eastern Europe, and Soviet amendments to the Declaration on Liberated Europe reduced the scope for compulsory joint Allied action.

Germany remained another major security concern, with the Soviet Union seeking to prevent the country from becoming a future military threat by reducing its economic and military capacity. Reparations were also an important Soviet demand, both as compensation for the destruction suffered during the war and as part of the wider question of Germany's post-war settlement.

Relations with the Western Allies were further affected by the dispute over the opening of a Second Front in Western Europe, as Stalin had repeatedly pressed Britain and the United States to launch a major operation while the cross-Channel invasion did not take place until 1944. The delay contributed to Soviet distrust of Western military intentions and remained relevant to Allied discussions at ARGONAUT.

Soviet interests also extended to the Pacific War, as Stalin had agreed at Tehran to enter the war against Japan after Germany's defeat. At ARGONAUT, the terms and strategic benefits associated with Soviet participation in the Pacific therefore remained an important subject of negotiation.



WORLD WAR II BACKGROUND

The Interwar Period and the Path to War (1918–1939)



The geopolitical landscape that precipitated the Second World War was forged in the aftermath of World War I. The Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919, officially ended the conflict but placed punishing economic and territorial burdens on Germany. The resulting instability, compounded by the global Stock Market Crash of 1929, created fertile ground for authoritarian regimes. In Italy, Benito Mussolini had already established a fascist dictatorship after coming to power in October 1922, seeking to involve Italy heavily in world affairs. In Asia, Japanese militarism surged as the Kwantung Army invaded resource-rich Manchuria on September 19, 1931, establishing the puppet state of Manchukuo and beginning a prolonged campaign of expansionism.

In Germany, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor on January 30, 1933. He rapidly dismantled the Weimar Republic, established a legal dictatorship, and initiated a massive rearmament program that openly violated the Treaty of Versailles, expanding the German Army to 500,000 men by 1935. The regime simultaneously implemented the Nuremberg Race Laws in 1935, stripping German Jews of their citizenship and forbidding marriage between Jews and Aryans. German aggression escalated steadily: the Wehrmacht occupied the demilitarized Rhineland in 1936, annexed Austria in the 1938 "Anschluss," and, following the Munich Agreement, absorbed the Sudetenland. The violence of the Nazi regime was put on full display during Kristallnacht on November 9 and 10, 1938, a violent anti-Jewish pogrom that swept across Germany.

The Outbreak Of War-

By the early part of 1939 the German dictator Adolf Hitler had become determined to invade and occupy Poland. Poland, for its part, had guarantees of French and British military support should it be attacked by Germany. Hitler intended to invade Poland anyway, but first he had to neutralize the possibility that the Soviet Union would resist the invasion of its western neighbor. Secret negotiations led on August 23–24 to the signing of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact in Moscow. In a secret protocol of this pact, the Germans and the Soviets agreed that Poland should be divided between them, with the western third of the country going to Germany and the eastern two-thirds being taken over by the U.S.S.R.

Having achieved this cynical agreement, the other provisions of which stupefied Europe even without divulgence of the secret protocol, Hitler thought that Germany could attack Poland with no danger of Soviet or British intervention and gave orders for the invasion to start on August 26. News of the signing, on August 25, of a formal treaty of mutual assistance between Great Britain and Poland (to supersede a previous though temporary agreement) caused him to postpone the start of hostilities for a few days. He was still determined, however, to ignore the diplomatic efforts of the western powers to restrain him. Finally, at 12:40 pm on August 31, 1939, Hitler ordered hostilities against Poland to start at 4:45 the next morning. The invasion began as ordered. In response, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, at 11:00 am and at 5:00 pm, respectively. World War II had begun.

Forces and resources of the European combatants, 1939

In September 1939 the Allies, namely Great Britain, France, and Poland, were together superior in industrial resources, population, and military manpower, but the German military, or Wehrmacht, because of its armament, training, doctrine, discipline, and fighting spirit, was the most efficient and effective fighting force for its size in the world. The index of military strength in September 1939 was the number of divisions that each nation could mobilize. Against Germany's 100 infantry divisions and six armoured divisions, France had 90 infantry divisions in metropolitan France, Great Britain had 10 infantry divisions, and Poland had 30

infantry divisions, 12 cavalry brigades, and one armoured brigade (Poland had also 30 reserve infantry divisions, but these could not be mobilized quickly). A division contained from 12,000 to 25,000 men.

Germany's campaigns in the west in 1940 destroyed the French army within six weeks and left Britain isolated under the leadership of Winston Churchill. The Battle of Britain preserved British independence, but Britain's capacity to defeat Germany alone was never plausible. The conflict became truly global in 1941. On 22 June Germany launched *Operation Barbarossa* against the Soviet Union, an attack which was intended not only to destroy the Soviet state but also to secure land and resources for German settlement and to eliminate what Nazi ideology called Judeo-Bolshevism. On 7 December Japan attacked the American fleet at *Pearl Harbor* and simultaneously moved against British, Dutch and American possessions in Southeast Asia; four days later Germany declared war on the United States. The three great powers that would meet at Yalta were now all belligerents against the Axis, but they had arrived at that position by very different routes and for different reasons.

The Holocaust and The Turning of the Tide (1942–1943)

As the war expanded, so did the Nazis' systematic genocide. In late 1941 and early 1942, the Nazis transitioned from mobile killing squads to industrialized extermination. At the Chełmno death camp, killing operations began on December 8, 1941, using specially modified vans to asphyxiate victims with carbon monoxide. This paved the way for the "Operation Reinhard" camps of Treblinka, Bełżec, and Sobibór, where nearly 1.7 million people were murdered between March 1942 and November 1943.

The early months of 1942 were brutal for the Allies. On the US Eastern Seaboard, German U-boats relentlessly hunted American shipping, while the US government, reacting to wartime paranoia, rounded up Japanese-American families and relocated them to desolate internment camps in February 1942. In the Pacific, American forces surrendered the Bataan Peninsula in April 1942, leading to the brutal 60-mile Bataan Death March, and the Philippines officially fell to the Japanese in May.

However, the momentum began to shift by mid-1942. The US launched the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo in April, and the Battle of Coral Sea in May marked the first time the US Navy successfully repelled the Imperial Japanese Navy. This was followed by the decisive US victory at the Battle of Midway in June 1942, where American carriers ambushed a Japanese task force. On land, the first major American ground offensive began in August 1942 when the 1st Marine Division landed at Guadalcanal, initiating a long and bloody campaign.

The Contemporary Situation, January and February of 1945

The European battlefield

In December 1944, Hitler had gambled on a surprise offensive through the Ardennes intended to split the British and American armies and capture Antwerp. The Battle of the Bulge, which began on 16 December, inflicted heavy casualties on American forces but consumed the last German armored reserves in the West. By the end of January 1945 the Allied line had been restored. Meanwhile the Red Army, responding in part to appeals from Churchill for relief in the Ardennes, launched the Vistula–Oder offensive on 12 January. Warsaw fell on 17 January, and within about three weeks Marshal Zhukov's First Belorussian Front reached the Oder and established bridgeheads near Küstrin, roughly seventy kilometers from Berlin. Silesia's coal and industrial basin, East Prussia and much of Pomerania were either taken or under attack. Budapest was under siege and would fall in mid-February.

The political landscape

Roosevelt had been elected to an unprecedented fourth term in November 1944 and was inaugurated on 20 January 1945. He was seriously ill with hypertensive heart disease, a condition of which his advisers were aware, though the public and the Soviet delegation were not. Stalin, by contrast, was at the height of his authority and prestige. He controlled the largest army in Europe, was advancing on the German capital, and held the political initiative in the territories the Red Army had entered. General de Gaulle's Provisional Government had been recognized by the three powers in October 1944, and he had concluded a treaty of alliance with Stalin in Moscow in December.

SITUATION OF GERMANY

For all three powers, the treatment of Germany was the central question of peace. Germany had twice within thirty years brought Europe to war, and the crimes committed under National Socialism, including the extermination of the Jews of Europe, created a moral and political imperative for a settlement that would be different in kind from that of 1919. Yet the Allies had never agreed on what that settlement should be. The Casablanca formula of unconditional surrender promised a total victory but not a programme. The European Advisory Commission had produced an outline for surrender terms and occupation zones, but the substantive decisions on dismemberment, reparations and the shape of a future German state had been deferred to the heads of government. Yalta was therefore the last opportunity to reach political agreement on Germany before the German collapse.

Principles for the Division of Germany

Three distinct principles competed with one another: dismemberment, zonal occupation and, at the opposite end, the preservation of German unity for administrative and economic purposes.

Dismemberment

The surrender terms drafted by the European Advisory Commission had provided for total disarmament and the assumption of supreme authority by the Allies, but they did not mention dismemberment. At Yalta, Stalin asked that the term be added, so that the three powers would possess supreme authority over Germany and take such steps, including complete disarmament, demilitarization and dismemberment, as they deemed requisite for future peace and security. At Tehran, Roosevelt's plan for five autonomous states, Churchill's plan for the isolation of Prussia and a southern Danubian confederation, and Stalin's skepticism about all such proposals had left the question open. At the conference, Stalin pressed for a clear statement of intent, and the British Prime Minister resisted a commitment, arguing that the matter was too complex to be decided without careful study by experts. The historical outcome was a compromise: the Protocol of Proceedings wrote dismemberment into the surrender terms, while the details were referred the details to a committee chaired by the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, with

the American ambassador in London, John Winant, and the Soviet ambassador, Fedor Gusev, and it was to consider whether France should be added. The delegates in the simulation must decide whether to follow this approach or to define the principles more precisely.

The arguments for dismemberment are that it would end the militarist potential of a centralised Prussian-dominated state, remove the industrial and demographic base for a future war, and give guarantees to Germany's neighbors. The arguments against are practical and moral: the German economy is integrated, dismemberment would be difficult to enforce and would sustain German nationalism, and it would place the burden of administering divided territories on the occupying powers for an indefinite period. Delegates should also bear in mind that the Atlantic Charter's principle of self-determination is difficult to reconcile with the forcible division of a national state.

Reparations

Alongside dismemberment, reparations formed the other major point of contention in the German settlement, and one on which the three powers arrived with fundamentally incompatible positions. Stalin entered the conference demanding a total reparations figure of \$20 billion, with half of that sum earmarked for the Soviet Union alone, a demand rooted directly in the scale of Soviet material destruction rather than in any agreed accounting of German capacity to pay. The Soviet delegation, guided by economic advisor Ivan Maisky, had already compiled detailed assessments of the devastation inflicted on Soviet industry, agriculture and infrastructure, and treated reparations less as a punitive gesture than as a mechanism for the direct transfer of German industrial capacity, machinery and labor to rebuild the Soviet economy.

The British position, shaped heavily by economic advisor John Maynard Keynes, was considerably more cautious, and drew directly on the lesson widely taken from the Treaty of Versailles: that reparations demands set beyond what a shattered economy could realistically sustain had helped destabilize Germany politically in the 1920s and had contributed to the conditions that allowed the Nazi party to rise. Churchill's delegation therefore worried that a repeat of punitive over-extraction would either collapse the German economy entirely, leaving the occupying powers

to bear the cost of administering a destitute population indefinitely, or would generate exactly the kind of resentment reparations were meant to prevent. The American position sat closer to the British than the Soviet one, though Washington was less directly exposed to the economic consequences of whatever figure was ultimately agreed, since American reparations claims were comparatively modest next to Soviet ones.

No final reparations figure was agreed at the conference. Surprised you are reading till now! Ask any EB member for “The project Manhattan code” and you might be awarded for your sincerity and efforts. Anyways, The \$20 billion figure, with the fifty percent Soviet share, was accepted only as a basis for further discussion by a reparations commission to be established in Moscow, a compromise that satisfied none of the three delegations completely and left the question of Germany's actual capacity to pay, and the mechanism by which reparations would be extracted, unresolved heading into the occupation itself.

Zonal occupation

During the conference, it was agreed upon that after the war, Germany would be split into four zones of control under the jurisdiction of the participant countries- United States of America, United Kingdom, USSR and France. Berlin, the capital, was also divided into four sectors. This division quickly became ideological, leading to the formation of two separate German states in 1949: the capitalist Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) and the socialist German Democratic Republic (East Germany). The French zone would be carved out from the predecided American and British zones. A joint allied control council would be established to link the four zones for administration and the country would be re-established under the democratic system.

Denazification.

In the conference it was decided that the key goals would include eradication of nazi ideology and bringing justice to war criminals. The soviet zone later became a communist state whereas the american and british zones became a capitalist state namely called East and West Germany respectively.

POLISH DISCUSSIONS

1. The Territorial Shift

The reshaping of Poland's borders was essentially a compromise forced by Joseph Stalin, who was determined to secure the USSR's western flank against future German aggression.

- **The Curzon Line as a Buffer:** Stalin argued that the Soviet Union was entitled to Poland's pre-war eastern territories because the Red Army had already bled to liberate them, and because the ethnically diverse region contained large populations of Belarusians and Ukrainians. The Allies accepted the **Curzon Line** (originally proposed in 1919) as Poland's new eastern boundary, stripping Poland of nearly **47% of its pre-war territory**.
- **German Compensation:** To compensate for this loss, Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed that Poland would expand north and west into Germany. This included the southern part of **East Prussia, Pomerania, and the industrial powerhouse of Silesia**.
- **Mass Displacement:** Moving the borders meant moving populations. Over **2 million Poles** were forced to migrate from the ceded eastern lands into the newly acquired western territories. Simultaneously, millions of Germans living in those regions were systematically expelled westward, creating a massive post-war humanitarian crisis.

2. The Government Crisis

Before Yalta, two competing factions claimed to be the legitimate government of Poland: the **London Government-in-Exile** (anti-communist, highly critical of Soviet designs) and the **Lublin Committee** (a pro-Soviet, communist-dominated provisional government set up by Stalin as the Red Army advanced).

- **The Allied Dilemma:** Churchill and Roosevelt fiercely advocated for the London Poles, arguing that they represented the pre-war democratic legal continuity. Stalin flatly refused, viewing the London government as hostile to the USSR.

- **The "Yalta Formula":** With Soviet troops physically occupying Polish soil, the Western Allies had little leverage. They ultimately agreed to recognize the Soviet-backed Lublin government as the core authority, on the condition that it be reorganized to include "democratic leaders" from both inside Poland and the London exile community. This compromise effectively sealed the political fate of Poland, as the communist faction retained all key ministries (including internal security).

3. The Elections Clause

To make the abandonment of the London government palatable to Western domestic audiences, Roosevelt insisted on explicit democratic guarantees.

- **The Promise:** Stalin signed the **Declaration on Liberated Europe**, promising free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.
- **The Loophole:** The Allies failed to establish any international oversight or enforcement mechanisms to monitor these elections. When Churchill asked for a specific timeline, Stalin vaguely answered that they could happen within one month, or at most a few months.
- **The Aftermath:** Taking advantage of the vague wording and lack of Allied presence, the Soviet secret police(NKVD) and local communist forces launched a campaign of political terror. They arrested, assassinated, and disqualified candidates from the democratic Polish People's Party. By the time the rigged elections finally took place in January 1947, the communists claimed an artificial landslide victory, cementing Poland's status behind the Iron Curtain.

EUROPEAN SITUATION

1. Romania: The First Blueprint for Sovietization

Romania was the most immediate and aggressive example of Soviet unilateralism following Yalta.

- **The Military Reality:** Having signed an armistice with the Allies in late 1944 after switching sides from the Axis, Romania was fully occupied by the Soviet Red Army. The Allied Control Commission (ACC) tasked with managing the country was entirely dominated by Soviet officials, rendering British and U.S. representatives powerless.
- **The Post-Yalta Coup (March 1945):** Barely three weeks after the Yalta Conference concluded, Stalin sent his Deputy Foreign Minister, Andrei Vyshinsky, to Bucharest. Vyshinsky delivered a famous ultimatum to Romania's King Michael, pounding his fist on the table and demanding the appointment of a pro-Soviet prime minister.
- **The Outcome:** The King was forced to appoint **Petru Groza**, a communist sympathizer, as Prime Minister. Groza's government immediately began purging pre-war democratic politicians, rigging the 1946 elections, and forcing King Michael to abdicate by late 1947, transforming Romania into a People's Republic.

2. Bulgaria: Ruthless Elimination of Agrarian Opposition

Bulgaria, like Romania, faced a swift transition into the Soviet orbit due to its geographic position and the immediate presence of Soviet troops.

- **The Fatherland Front:** In September 1944, the Soviet Union declared war on Bulgaria, and the Red Army quickly occupied the country. A coalition government called the **Fatherland Front** took power. While it initially contained non-communists, the Bulgarian Communist Party held the critical ministries of Interior (controlling the police) and Justice.
- **Post-Yalta Repression:** Following Yalta, the communists weaponized these ministries to carry out "People's Courts." Tens of thousands of alleged Axis

collaborators—including former government ministers, royal advisers, and military officers—were executed or sent to labor camps.

- **The Elimination of Nikola Petkov:** The standard-bearer for Bulgarian democracy was Nikola Petkov, leader of the popular Agrarian National Union. Despite Western protests invoking the Yalta agreements, Petkov was arrested on trumped-up charges of treason, sentenced to death, and executed in 1947. Bulgaria became one of the most rigidly loyal Soviet satellites under Georgi Dimitrov.

3. Hungary: Temporary Democracy and the "Salami Tactics"

Unlike Romania and Bulgaria, Hungary's transition to a Soviet satellite took slightly longer because the Hungarian Communist Party lacked deep-rooted domestic support.

- **The Siege of Budapest:** The Red Army captured Budapest in February 1945, right as the Yalta Conference was ending, after a brutal siege. The country was in ruins, and the Soviet-led Allied Control Commission under Marshal Kliment Voroshilov held absolute authority.
- **The Free Election Defeat (November 1945):** In compliance with the Yalta Declaration, Hungary actually held a remarkably free election in November 1945. The communists suffered a crushing defeat, winning only 17% of the vote. The moderate **Independent Smallholders' Party** won an absolute majority with 57%.
- **Mátyás Rákosi's "Salami Tactics":** Unable to win democratically, communist leader Mátyás Rákosi utilized Soviet military backing to dismantle the democratic majority "slice by slice." The Soviet-controlled secret police arrested Smallholders' Party leaders on fabricated charges of anti-Soviet conspiracies. By 1947, the democratic opposition was fractured or exiled, and a single-party communist state was established by 1949.

4. Czechoslovakia: The Illusion of Coexistence

Czechoslovakia entered the post-Yalta era under vastly different circumstances. It was the only functioning democracy in Eastern Europe before the war, and its

leadership genuinely believed they could act as a "bridge" between the West and the Soviet Union.

- **The Beneš-Stalin Alliance:** President-in-exile **Edvard Beneš** signed a treaty of friendship with Stalin in 1943. Beneš believed that by willingly cooperating with Moscow on foreign policy, Stalin would allow Czechoslovakia to retain its internal democratic systems.
- **The 1946 Elections:** In May 1946, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia won 38% of the vote in a free election—the highest percentage ever achieved by a European communist party in a free vote. Communist leader **Klement Gottwald** became Prime Minister of a coalition government.
- **The Marshall Plan Turning Point (1947):** The illusion of independence shattered when Czechoslovakia enthusiastically accepted the American Marshall Plan for economic aid. Stalin immediately summoned Gottwald to Moscow and ordered him to reject the aid. Beneš capitulated, realizing that Czechoslovak sovereignty was subordinate to Soviet strategic veto power.
- **The 1948 Coup:** By February 1948, as non-communist ministers attempted to resist communist infiltration of the police forces, Gottwald orchestrated a well-planned coup d'état. Backed by Soviet troops massed on the border and armed factory militias, the communists took complete control, culminating in the mysterious death of democratic Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk.

Broaden your vision, Deepen your roots

PACIFIC WAR

Pacific War, major theatre of World War II that covered a large portion of the Pacific Ocean, East Asia, and Southeast Asia, with significant engagements occurring as far south as northern Australia and as far north as the Aleutian Islands.

Japan's strategy in the Pacific and Southeast Asia

The Japanese war plan, aimed at the American, British, and Dutch possessions in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia, was of a rather makeshift character. The first draft, submitted by the chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staff, was accepted by Imperial General Headquarters early in September 1941. The lateness of the draft was due largely to the long indecision about going to war with such powerful countries, but partly to the complicated system of command. The Army and Navy each had its own Supreme Command, and both of them, under the constitution of 1889, had become virtually independent of the civil government. Cooperation in planning and in execution took place only at top levels. Even when Imperial General Headquarters was established under the nominal command of Emperor Hirohito (the constitutional supreme commander), the separate command system was rigidly followed.


Since 1907, when Japanese military planners first defined hypothetical enemies, Russia, the United States, and France fell into this category. From the geostrategic standpoint, the Army would have the major role in a war against Russia, the Navy in one against the United States.

By early 1945, Japan had lost the initiative in the Pacific, but was far from defeat. The United States had advanced along two axes: General MacArthur's drive through New Guinea to the Philippines, and Admiral Nimitz's campaign through the Gilbert, Marshall and Mariana Islands. The naval victory at Leyte Gulf in October 1944 crippled the Imperial Japanese Navy, the capture of the Marianas gave the American air force bases from which B-29 bombers could attack the home islands, and American forces landed on Luzon on 9 January 1945. Yet Japan



retained large land forces, in China, Manchuria and the home islands, and a doctrine of desperate resistance that produced heavy casualties in every American assault, at Peleliu and Saipan. American planners expected that Iwo Jima and Okinawa would be costly, and that an invasion of Kyushu, provisionally planned for the autumn of 1945 as Operation Olympic and followed by a landing near Tokyo in 1946, would produce casualties on a scale that public opinion might not sustain. Estimates of the time required to defeat Japan after the fall of Germany ranged up to eighteen months.

Two other factors framed the decision. The Manhattan Project had not yet produced a working weapon, and American planners assumed that the war would be won by blockade, bombing, and invasion. The Japanese Ichigo offensive of 1944 had overrun much of southern China and exposed the weakness of Chiang Kai-shek's armies, pushing American planners to rely on Pacific bases and, in effect, on Soviet action against the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, which American intelligence estimated at about a million men and which lay beyond the practical reach of American forces.



THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The United Nations was the successor to the League of Nations which took shape primarily in 1941 when the Atlantic Charter was signed between Roosevelt and Churchill. The Dumbarton Oaks Conference laid down the foundational stone before the Yalta conference where the ideas of the United Nations Security Council were born alongside the core objectives of the international body in the making.

At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden agreed to draft a declaration that included a call for “a general international organization, based on the principle sovereign equality of all nations.” An agreed declaration was issued after a Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow in October 1943. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt met with Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin in Tehran, Iran, in November 1943, he proposed an international organization comprising an assembly of all member states and a 10-member executive committee to discuss social and economic issues. The United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China would enforce peace as “the four policemen.” Meanwhile Allied representatives founded a set of task-oriented organizations: the Food and Agricultural Organization (May 1943), the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (November 1943), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (April 1944), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (July 1944), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (November 1944).

1. The United States:

- **Stance and Motives:** The United States, led by President Roosevelt, viewed the United Nations as the cornerstone of the post-war world order. Roosevelt's administration operated with moral clarity, aiming to establish universal peace, human progress, and political freedom.
- **Objectives:** Roosevelt sought to replace traditional balance-of-power politics and exclusive spheres of influence with a collective security framework. He proposed the concept of the "Four Policemen" the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China who would possess the power to deal immediately with any threat to peace. Roosevelt believed that

lesser powers could be kept peaceful if the Great Powers directed a global military response through a newly proposed Security Council.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized that the League of Nations failed primarily because the U.S. refused to join and the organization lacked enforcement power. The wartime U.S. perspective focused on two main pillars:

- **The Four Policemen:** Roosevelt's core vision rested on the theory that the major Allied powers—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China (with France added later) would actively police world peace.
- **Bipartisan Domestic Support:** To prevent a repeat of the U.S. Senate's 1919 rejection of the League, the Roosevelt administration meticulously integrated both Republican and Democratic lawmakers into the planning process to secure domestic consensus

2. The Soviet Union: Security and the Absolute Veto

- **Great Power Dominance:** Moscow wanted an organization where a small council of major powers handled real security enforcement, shielding Soviet interests from a potential capitalist majority in a larger assembly.
- **Protection of Sovereignty:** The USSR strongly resisted any UN intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states, fearing outside interference in its domestic policies or buffer zones.
- **Long-Term Stability:** Joseph Stalin framed the postwar security organization as a 50 year guarantee of peace backed by the cooperative military might of the leading Allied victors.
- **Objectives:** During the Dumbarton Oaks conference, the Soviet Union contended that the permanent members of the Security Council must have an absolute veto in all matters, including disputes to which they were direct parties. Stalin's objective was to ensure that the UN could never be weaponized against the USSR. Furthermore, Stalin initially demanded that all sixteen of the Soviet constituent republics be admitted to the UN. This was partly to balance the votes of the British Dominions and India, which Churchill had pointed out.
- **Yalta Conference Compromise (1945):** At the Yalta Conference, outstanding voting deadlocks were resolved when Stalin and Franklin D.

Roosevelt agreed that a permanent member's veto would not block procedural discussions, and a compromise admitted the Ukrainian SSR and Byelorussian SSR as independent UN member seats alongside the USSR.

3. The United Kingdom:

- **Stance and Motives:** Prime Minister Winston Churchill was a traditionalist who prioritized the preservation of the British Empire and the maintenance of a balance of power on the European continent. While he supported the UN, he was wary of American anti-colonialism and Soviet expansionism. While the US approached the UN with a highly Wilsonian, idealistic internationalism, the UK's perspective under Winston Churchill was deeply pragmatic and realist, focused on national survival and global influence.
- **The Foreign Framework (1943–1944):** British diplomats Gladwyn Jebb and Charles Webster led the Foreign Office Economic and Reconstruction Department. They heavily influenced the "Four-Power Plan", providing detailed constitutional drafts that synthesized historical lessons from the Congress of Vienna and the failed League of Nations.
- **Objectives:** Churchill aimed to ensure that the UN did not interfere with British imperial holdings. During debates over UN membership, Churchill advocated for the inclusion of the British Dominions and India to bolster British influence.
- **Securing a Permanent Seat for France:** Churchill fiercely championed giving France a permanent seat and veto power on the Security Council. He argued that a strong Western European ally was necessary to offset Soviet weight on the continent once the US eventually withdrew its troops. Stalin reluctantly conceded.

THE DAWN OF THE ATOMIC AGE

The Manhattan Project was initiated in 1942 as a massive, highly classified effort to develop the world's first atomic weapons, driven by the fear that Nazi Germany might succeed in building one first, and it remained the most closely guarded secret of the war throughout its development.

Nuclear weapons were never formally discussed at Yalta. By February 1945, the Manhattan Project had been underway for nearly three years as a closely held American, British, and Canadian enterprise, governed by the Quebec Agreement of August 1943 and the Hyde Park Aide-Mémoire of September 1944, through which Roosevelt and Churchill had agreed the project would remain secret from the Soviet Union. The two leaders had already declined a proposal from the Danish physicist Niels Bohr to inform Stalin of the weapon's existence and to open discussions on its international control before it was completed. Stalin, however, was far from unaware of the programme. Soviet intelligence had reported on the existence of the Anglo-American project as early as 1941 and 1942, and the Soviet Union's own atomic effort, led by Igor Kurchatov, had already been expanded by 1943 in response. Despite this, the subject was raised by neither side at Yalta, with Stalin choosing not to reveal what his intelligence services already knew, and Roosevelt continuing to withhold what remained, in name at least, an American secret.

The silence around the bomb at Yalta was not accidental, and it shaped the negotiations in ways neither delegation acknowledged openly. American planners still assumed, in February 1945, that the defeat of Japan would require a conventional invasion, and it was this assumption, rather than any confidence in a forthcoming weapon, that drove Roosevelt's determination to secure a firm Soviet commitment to enter the Pacific War. Had the bomb been a certainty rather than an unproven theory at the time of the conference, the American bargaining position on Far Eastern concessions, including the territorial and port arrangements granted to Stalin in Manchuria and Sakhalin, might have looked very different. In this sense, the absence of the bomb from the negotiating table did not mean it was absent from the negotiations themselves, it simply meant its influence ran beneath the surface rather than across it.

The secrecy Roosevelt and Churchill maintained also proved considerably less effective than either believed at the time. Within the Manhattan Project itself, a small number of scientists sympathetic to the Soviet cause, most notably the German-born physicist Klaus Fuchs, had already begun passing theoretical and technical material back to Moscow well before Yalta convened, a channel that would continue to operate for several more years. Combined with the intelligence Stalin's networks had already gathered on the project's existence, this meant the Soviet leader arrived at the conference with a far clearer picture of American capability than his American and British counterparts assumed. Stalin's calm, even indifferent reaction when Truman later mentioned the weapon at Potsdam in 1945 is generally attributed to this prior knowledge rather than to any failure to grasp what was being described to him.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who held direct oversight of the project on the American side, was acutely aware of how the weapon might alter the postwar balance of power even before it had been tested, and he would go on to argue after Hiroshima that the bomb should have factored more openly into wartime diplomacy rather than being treated purely as a military instrument to be unveiled once ready. This tension, between treating the bomb as a battlefield weapon and treating it as a diplomatic one, was never resolved at Yalta because the weapon did not yet exist in a usable form, but it would come to dominate Allied relations within months of the conference's conclusion, as the successful Trinity test in July 1945 handed Washington a form of leverage that had been entirely theoretical when the Big Three sat down in Crimea.

QUESTIONS

Central Questions

1. Where military occupation has already decided the facts on the ground, as in Poland and the wider Eastern Bloc, what real weight can a negotiated principle like free elections or self-determination still carry?
2. How should the Allies balance the military necessity of Soviet cooperation, sought through occupation arrangements in Europe and through action against the Kwantung Army in the Pacific, against the sovereignty of the states whose territory and governments are being decided in their absence?
3. Can the collective security envisioned for a new international organization coexist with the spheres of influence the same powers are simultaneously negotiating across Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean?

Other Questions

4. Should Germany be formally dismembered, as Stalin pressed for, or should the details be deferred to a committee while zonal occupation proceeds regardless, as the historical delegates chose to do?
5. What reparations figure properly balances Soviet demands for compensation, given the scale of destruction the USSR suffered, against the British concern that an over-extracted German economy would repeat the instability that followed Versailles?
6. Does reorganizing the Lublin government to include "democratic leaders" while the communist faction retains every key ministry, including internal security, constitute genuine reorganization, or does it simply legitimize an outcome already decided by occupation?
7. What enforcement mechanism, if any, could make the promise of free elections under the Declaration on Liberated Europe binding rather than symbolic, given that none was historically established?
8. Should the principle of free elections be applied uniformly across Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, or does each state's differing political and military situation call for a different approach?

9. What precedent is set by negotiating the terms of Manchuria's ports, railways, and territory in exchange for Soviet entry into the Pacific War, without China present at the table?
10. Should the Security Council veto extend to disputes in which a permanent member is itself a direct party, as the Soviet Union demanded at Dumbarton Oaks?



PAPERWORK

Please note that the ratification of the paperwork will be informed to the delegates either through mail or in committee. Do not further act upon any document aforementioned before the Executive Board ratifies it. This continuous crisis committee will allow delegates to write 5 forms of paperwork:

1. Communiqués
2. Directives
3. Position Paper
4. Official Statement
5. The yalta declaration

All Paperworks have to be emailed to the following email id-
yaltaconference.ssmun26@gmail.com

Brief explanations of all these forms of paperwork are provided below:

COMMUNIQUÉS

Communiqués are messages from, usually, a portfolio or the entire committee to another country, organization, person or group of people. Communiques can be bilateral (between two portfolios) or multilateral. They facilitate dialogue with relevant actors in a crisis so that delegates can take action to resolve the various crises presented to them in committee. Communiqués often include negotiations, threats, and requests for aid or support but are not limited to those topics. Keep in mind that a communiqué needs to be just as well worded as a directive and needs to be realistic enough. Delegates are to keep in mind that the Executive Board has absolute discretion with regards to ratifying and reading out any Communique submitted by a delegate as an update to the committee. It is crucial for any form of communique to answer these 3 questions,

1. What is being achieved in the communique? (with a summary if more than 3 pages)
2. Why is this communique relevant to the committee at the time and beneficial to you?

3. How are you achieving what you wish to achieve in the communique? (details)
Communiqués may be either private or public. The deadline shall be 9th October 2026, 11:59 p.m.

DIRECTIVES

A directive is a piece of paperwork that stands for collective action undertaken by a single nation or a group of nations. This is often seen in crisis committees, as they are used for strategic planning of military attacks. Directives are often ‘pitted’ against each other and the paperwork that is more detailed and feasible is usually ratified. If a directive is ratified by the executive board, it is often introduced as an update. A Public Directive is written to take direct action that a country or an individual has decided to initiate with regards to a particular policy or take a certain action which can affect the dynamics of committees as a whole. It is only read out to the committee by the Executive Board if it is ratified or approved by the Executive Board. An example of a public directive is provided below (recommended to be more comprehensive than the example provided):

POSITION PAPER

Please note that this committee will be requiring delegates to submit a position paper as part of the pre committee paperwork. The deadline for the position paper shall be 7th October 2026, 11:59 p.m.

A position paper is the summary of the assigned portfolio’s stance with regards to the agenda and explains their take on the ongoing situation and proposes their solutions.

Basic format of a Position Paper:

The structuring of the Position Papers is intended to elicit responses from the delegates that provide a clear picture of a nation's or portfolio's stance on a particular topic area. By providing an outline of a Position Paper, we hope that delegates will be able to illustrate clear knowledge of their country or portfolio's policies and interests instead of simply regurgitating parts of the Study Guide. However, all delegates should also read the section on Position Papers in their study guides and heed their Executive Board’s specific instructions.

A Position Paper should include three sections, as outlined below:


A. *Background of the Topic*: In your allotment's opinion, what are the main elements of the problem? What are the roots of those elements?

B. *Position taken by your delegation*: What are your allotment's interests in the situation? What are your allotment's policies on the topic? What steps would you like to see taken to deal with the problem?

C. *Policy and objectives*: What does your allotment believe needs to be done to solve the problem? What do you predict will be the main opposition to your proposals?

OFFICIAL STATEMENT:

It is essentially like a Presidential Statement with the objective to make a public declaration or 'Official Statement' that will be announced to the entire world, not limited to the members of the conference. Mostly, the Executive Board will ask you to send it specifically if required.



COMMITTEE EXPECTATIONS

We would not look highly upon any drastic policy changes or mythical and volatile communique ideas, because we want ideas to be creative from a realistic point of view that takes the committee forward in a productive direction. Here, the most sensibly innovative ideas will be awarded over “dynamic and drastic” ideas for committee attention.

The figures mentioned in this document are estimates intended to give delegates a rough idea of the devastation caused. The figures and words from the Study Guide shall not be cited in committee, and it shall be upon the EB’s discretion to determine the credibility of any figures cited by delegates.

Moreover, the vocabulary used in the Study Guide may not comply with the freeze date. However, delegates may not violate the freeze date citing the Study Guide. This document is for reference, not for citation. The EB shall have full discretion over any conflicts arising from such information in committee.

Furthermore, the map provided above is the map that shall be referred to in committee. If any delegate uses another map, it shall be upon the EB’s discretion whether it shall be accepted or not, and the EB shall have the final say in any conflict arising in committee.

Please approach us if you have any doubts, politely and respectfully. We would love to entertain them—unless you are too annoying, in which case, you will be redirected to the Rapporteur.

If you do not receive an instant reply, please reach out again; the Chairpersons do take some time to reply.

Also note: “Casablanca, Casablanca, Casablanca.”

REFERENCES

Primary Sources and Documents

<https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp> - The 1941 foundational declaration setting out American and British post-war goals, emphasizing self-determination and free trade.

<https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/declaration-by-united-nations> - The 1942 treaty formalizing the Allied powers and committing them to the defeat of the Axis without a separate peace.

<https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/moscow.asp> - The 1943 declarations establishing early frameworks for international security, Italian democracy, and the prosecution of war crimes.

<https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/cairo.asp> - The 1943 Allied commitment to stripping Japan of its imperial conquests and ensuring a free Korea.

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